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INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control Act of 1970 ("the Act")1 to unify and rationalize its treatment 
of drug offenses.2 The Act was an enormous piece of legislation, re­
quiring months of congressional hearings before it was passed.3 To-
* I would like to thank Peter Westen for comments on an earlier draft and Michael 
Heller for three years of support and advice. 
1. 21 u.s.c. §§ 801-971 {1994). 
2 See Act of Oct 27, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 1970 U.S.C.C. A.N. (84 Stat. 1236) 4566, 
4567; see also United States v. Santana, No. 95-10284-P B S-008, 1997 WL 258599, at *2 {D. 
Mass. Mar. 11, 1997) (quoting same) ("[T]he legislative policy of the Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 [was] to 'deal in [a] comprehensive fashion with 
the growing menace of drug abuse in the United States' in part by 'providing for an overall 
balanced scheme of criniinal penalties for offenses involving drugs.' " {third alteration 
added)). 
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day, the Act encompasses over 150 sections of title 21 of the U.S. 
Code and regulates behavior ranging from manufacturing4 and misla­
beling5 to prescribing6 controlled substances. Like any piece of com­
plex legislation, the Act has spawned its share of litigation.7 One cont­
roversy has defied satisfactory resolution: the meaning of the innocu­
ous phrase, "the offense," in section 851(a)(2).8 
The statute's structure is relatively straightforward. In 21 U.S.C. § 
841, the Act proscribes individual drug trafficking.9 Section 841 fur­
ther provides different mandatory minimum penalties for offenders 
based on the type and quantity of drugs being sold and also on the de­
fendant's criminal history. Most importantly for purposes of this 
Note, section 841 doubles a defendant's mandatory minimum sentence 
if he has a prior drug-related conviction.10 The availability of this dou­
bling provision, however, is limited by procedural requirements in 21 
U.S.C. § 851, including that the offense for which such increased pun­
ishment may be imposed must have proceeded by indictment or 
waiver of indictment.11 
Defendants with prior felony drug convictions from state courts 
have sometimes argued that their sentences cannot be doubled be­
cause their prior state court convictions proceeded by criminal infor­
mation and not by indictment or waiver of indictment.12 Most courts 
3. See generally ROBERT L. BOGOMOLNY ET AL., A HANDBOOK ON THE 1970 
FEDERAL DRUG ACT 17-20 (1975). 
Id. 
4. See 21 U.S.C. § 842. 
5. See 21 U.S.C. § 825. 
6. See 21 U.S.C. § 829. 
7. Over 20,000 federal court decisions have considered 21 U.S.C. § 841 alone. 
8. 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(2). Section 851(a) reads in relevant part: 
(1) No person who stands convicted of an offense under this part shall be sentenced to in· 
creased punishment by reason of one or more prior convictions, unless before trial, or before 
entry of a plea of guilty, the United States attorney files an information with the court (and 
serves a copy of such information on the person or counsel for the person) stating in writing 
the previous convictions to be relied upon . .. .  {2) An information may not be filed under 
this section if the increased punishment which may be imposed is imprisonment for a term in 
excess of three years unless the person either waived or was afforded prosecution by indict· 
ment for the offense for which such increased punishment may be imposed. 
9. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). The Act's definition of individual drug trafficking is "[T]o 
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or 
dispense, a controlled substance . . . •  " 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). 
10. See 21 U.S.C. § 841{b )(l)(A)-(C). 
11. 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(2). 
12 See McKee v. United States, 167 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Ortiz, 143 
F.3d 728 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Collado, 106 F.3d 1097 (2d Cir. 1997); United States 
v. Harden, 37 F.3d 595 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Trevino-Rodriguez, 994 F.2d 533 
(8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Burrell, 963 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Adams, 914 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Espinosa, 827 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 
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reaching the issue have held that "the offense" in section 851(a)(2) re­
fers to the present offense.13 Therefore, according to these cases, de­
fendants' mandatory minimum sentences for their present offenses 
should be doubled regardless of whether their prior convictions pro­
ceeded by indictment or criminal information. 
In 1997, the Second Circuit addressed this issue for the first time in 
United States v. Collado14 and found that section 851(a)(2) was am­
biguous.15 The court reasoned that it would be irrational to distinguish 
between prior convictions from states that use an indictment system 
and those that do not. But on the other hand, the court found: "All 
federal felony prosecutions are required to proceed by indictment. 
Accordingly ... it would have been redundant for Cogress to require 
that the instant offense be prosecuted by indictment or waiver thereof 
when it is impossible for the offense to be prosecuted any other 
way." 16 Unable to determine the legislative intent behind section 
851(a)(2), the Collado court applied the principle of lenity - requir­
ing ambiguous statutes to be interpreted in favor of defendants - and 
held that section 851(a)(2) refers to the prior offense.17 Therefore, the 
defendant's prior conviction from state court that did not proceed by 
indictment or waiver of indictment could not trigger a sentence en­
hancement. 
1987); United States v. Santana, No. 95-10284-PBS-008, 1997 WL 258599 (D. Mass. Mar. 11, 
1997). The nature of prosecuting by indictment is discussed infra note 26. 
13. See Espinosa, 827 F.2d at 617 (rejecting an interpretation of the statute that would 
require excluding prior convictions from states that "happen to use a felony complaint sys­
tem rather than a grand jury indictment system"); see also United States v. Coleman, 151 
F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Ortega, 150 F. 3d 937 (8th Cir. 1998); Ortiz, 143 
F.3d at 730; Harden, 37 F.3d 595 (11th Cir. 1994); Trevino-Rodriguez, 994 F. 2d 533 (8th Cir. 
1993); Burrell, 963 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1992); Adams, 914 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir. 1990); Daniels 
v. United States, Nos. CIV. A.98-969, CRIM.A.95-369, 1998 WL 355527, at *4 (E. D. Pa. June 
29, 1998); Eubanks v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 2d 455, 466 (S.D.N. Y. 1998); United States 
v. Spells, 994 F. Supp. 585, 586 (M.D. Pa. 1998); Santana, 1997 WL 258599 (D. Mass. Mar. 11, 
1997). 
14. 106F.3d 1097 (2d Cir. 1997), overruled by Ortiz, 143 F.3d at 729. 
15. The Second Circuit found the competing interpretations unsatisfying both expressly, 
see Collado, 106 F.3d at 1103 ("We conclude, based on the foregoing analysis, that there is 
absent with respect to§ 851(a)(2) an obvious intention of the legislature. " (internal quota­
tions omitted)), and implicitly, by applying the principle of lenity. The principle of lenity is 
appropriate only when no clear statutory meaning can be discerned. See Chapman v. United 
States, 500 U. S. 453, 463 (1991) ("The rule of lenity . . . is not applicable unless there is a 
grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and structure of the Act . . . such that even 
after a court has seized every thing from which aid can be derived, it is still left with an am­
biguous statute." (internal quotations and alterations omitted)). 
16. Collado, 106 F.3d at 1103. 
17. See Collado, 106 F.3d at 1103. The principle of lenity "requires the sentencing court 
to impose the lesser of two penalties where there is an actual ambiguity over which penalty 
should apply. " United States v. Fisher, 58 F.3d 96, 99 (4th Cir. 1995). In Collado, the defen­
dant had a prior conviction from a state court that had not proceeded by indictment. Ap­
plying lenity, therefore, meant applying the § 851 indictment requirement to Collado's prior 
state conviction, thus preventing his sentence from being doubled pursuant to § 841. 
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Since Collado, the Second Circuit reversed its position in United 
States v. Ortiz.18 Ortiz identified a class of federal prosecutions that do 
not proceed by indictment or waiver of indictment: namely, prosecu­
tions in Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the Panama Canal Zone. Thus, 
according to Ortiz, section 851(a)(2) was intended to exclude from the 
section 841 doubling provisions prosecutions in these United States 
territories. Ortiz, for the first time, addressed directly the deeper 
problem of statutory construction lurking within section 851(a)(2): 
whether prior or present, which prosecutions were the indictment re­
quirement meant to exclude as triggers for a sentence enhancement? 
And if not prior state prosecutions, then what present - and neces­
sarily federal - prosecutions do not proceed by indictment or waiver 
of indictment? According to Ortiz, the indictment requirement repre­
sents a congressional effort to prevent sentences from being doubled 
by reason of prosecutions in the Caribbean. 
The Second Circuit's brief nonconformity between 1997 and 1998 
was more than an accidental hiccup. Collado raised critical interpre­
tive questions that no court, including the Ortiz court, has yet to re­
solve.19 The new conformity between the circuits merely disguises a 
statutory ambiguity that may subject many defendants to penalties 
twice as severe as they deserve. If "the offense" refers to the prior of­
fense, then courts will have to distinguish in their sentencing between 
prior convictions from states that proceed by indictment and those 
from states that do not. On the other hand, according to the pre-Ortiz 
courts which found that all federal prosecutions proceed by indict­
ment, "the offense" is mere surplusage if it refers to the present of­
fense. The Ortiz interpretation salvages the statute, demonstrating 
that the indictment requirement is not superfluous as applied to fed­
eral prosecutions. But Ortiz is also unsatisfying. It too fails to "ra­
tionalize" drug sentences, offering no reason why Congress would 
have intended special treatment for felony drug prosecutions in the 
Caribbean. 
This Note follows the Ortiz decision by rejecting the conflicting 
line of cases which argue that section 851(a)(2) refers either to the 
18. 143 F.3d 728 (2d Cir. 1998). The basis for Ortiz is discussed infra Section II.A. The 
Ortiz decision substantially advances interpretations of§ 851(a)(2) by offering one plausible 
explanation for the indictment requirement. Nevertheless, the Collado opinion is still rele­
vant and important because it demonstrates the statutory ambiguity at the heart of the con­
troversy. It is interesting and perhaps important to note that Judge Leval, who authored the 
opinion in Ortiz overruling Collado, was a member of the panel in Collado and joined in its 
majority opinion. 
19. Prior to its reversal, courts commented on Collado's careful reasoning. See, e.g., 
Santana, 1997 WL 258599, at *1 ("Defendant's argument finds support in a thoughtful 
Second Circuit opinion."). At least one district court granted habeas relief to a federal 
prisoner because of the Collado decision. See McKee v. United States, 167 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 
1999) (reversing a district court's unpublished order vacating defendant's sentence pursuant 
to Collado). 
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present or to the prior offense. This Note focuses instead on devel­
oping an affirmative interpretation of the indictment requirement, 
identifying another and more compelling class of federal prosecutions 
that do not proceed by indictment or waiver of indictment: juvenile 
convictions, which proceed by criminal information. Thus, the section 
851(a)(2) indictment requirement should be interpreted to prevent 
sentence enhancements for defendants with prior juvenile convictions. 
Part I of this Note examines the two strongest arguments courts 
have raised in support of their respective positions: (1) that 
Congress's goal of enacting a comprehensive sentencing structure for 
drug offenses is undermined if some prior state convictions are in­
cluded, while others are excluded, as triggers for a sentence 
enhancement, and (2) that section 851(a)(2) is mere surplusage if it 
refers to the present offense. Part II examines the Ortiz decision and 
argues that its Caribbean interpretation of the indictment requirement 
is unsupported by the Act's legislative history, congressional concerns, 
or by any of the Act's other statutory provisions. Part II instead pro­
poses that Congress intended in section 851(a)(2) to exclude juvenile 
felony convictions from triggering section 841 sentence enhancements. 
With the strongest counterarguments overcome, Part II returns to the 
original statutory ambiguity and demonstrates that the Act's language 
and structure are most internally consistent if "the offense" refers to 
the prior offense and, specifically, excludes prior juvenile convictions 
from section 84l's doubling provisions. The Note concludes that 
courts should interpret "the offense" in section 851(a)(2) as referring 
to a defendant's prior juvenile convictions and should not prohibit 
prior state court convictions, whether proceeding by indictment or 
criminal information, from triggering the Act's doubling provisions. 
I. COMPREHENSIVENESS AND SURPLUSAGE: TWO 
UNCONVINCING RATIONALES 
This Part considers and refutes the two strongest rationales courts 
have employed to resolve whether "the offense" in section 851(a)(2) is 
the present or the prior offense. Section I.A considers the argument 
that "the offense" must refer to the present offense, or courts will have 
to distinguish between prior convictions from states that happen to use 
an indictment system and prior convictions from states that do not. 
Section I.B addresses the argument that section 85l(a)(2) must refer 
to the prior offense, or the section is mere surplusage. Part I con­
cludes that neither argument explains the section 851 indictment re­
quirement and that an affirmative interpretation of the statute, like 
that provided by Ortiz, is required. 
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A Distinguishing Between Prior Convictions from Indictment and 
Non-Indictment States 
If section 851(a)(2) refers to the prior conviction, then prior for­
eign or state convictions from non-indictment prosecutions will not 
trigger a sentence enhancement. The sentencing anomalies that would 
result from such an interpretation are a strong reason not to interpret 
section 851(a)(2) as referring to prior convictions. 
Presently, approximately one-third of the states require the use of 
an indictment in felony prosecutions.20 Interpreting "the offense" as 
the prior offense would require courts to distinguish between, for ex­
ample, a defendant with a prior drug conviction from New Hampshire 
which proceeded by indictment and a defendant with a prior convic­
tion for the same crime from Vermont who was prosecuted by crimi­
nal information. The defendant with a prior conviction from New 
Hampshire would be subjected to twice the mandatory minimum pen­
alty as would be imposed on the defendant with a prior conviction 
from Vermont. 
A court has reasoned that "it would have been incongruous for 
Congress to have amended the statute to permit prior state convic­
tions to be used for sentencing enhancements only in the indictment 
states."21 If section 851(a)(2) refers to the prior conviction, prosecu­
tions from states or foreign countries that prosecute by criminal in­
formation would not trigger a section 841 sentence enhancement.22 
This is an unprincipled basis upon which to distinguish between prior 
convictions.23 
The Second Circuit in Collado tried to diminish the strength of this 
argument, writing: "[I]t is not clear whether Congress was looking to 
expand the scope [of section 841(b) prior convictions] to include all 
state and foreign convictions or to include just those where the person 
either waived or was afforded prosecution by indictment."24 There­
fore, according to the Collado court, it may not have been incongruous 
for Congress to have included an indictment requirement for prior 
20. See Santana, 1997 WL 258599, at *2 (citing 2 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 208, at 15 (13th ed. 1990)); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & 
JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 686-87 (2d ed. 1992). 
21. Santana, 1997 WL 258599, at *2. 
22 See United States v. Espinosa, 827 F2d 604, 617 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that such an 
· interpretation "would exclude from the statute's ambit prior convictions in those states or 
foreign countries that happen to use a felony complaint system rather than a grand jury in­
dictment system"). 
23. For a discussion of indictment's inadequacy as a procedural safeguard, see infra note 
26. 
24. Collado, 106 F 3d at 1102. 
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convictions. The indictment requirement potentially "provides an ap­
propriate safeguard, namely, that the prior conviction, which is the ba­
sis for a substantial increase in the number of years a defendant is in­
carcerated, was the result of an indictment by a grand jury."25 
Although the Collado court was correct in that nothing in the Act's 
legislative history resolves this issue decisively, the procedural safe­
guard argument lacks force. Few, if any, commentators today suggest 
that indictment provides a defendant with any significant protection.26 
Indictment, at the least, is not such a core constitutional protection 
that it must be incorporated against the states. It has been well settled 
since the nineteenth century that states can develop their own meth­
ods of criminal prosecution without offending due process.27 Absent 
clear legislative history to the contrary, indictment's shielding function 
does not justify distinguishing between prior convictions from differ­
ent states. A recidivist heroin dealer with a properly prosecuted prior 
conviction for selling drugs should have his mandatory minimum sen­
tence doubled whether the prior conviction was from New Hampshire 
or Vermont. Courts are rightly unwilling to adopt an interpretation of 
section 851(a)(2) which dramatically increases criminal penalties 
based on such an arbitrary distinction between states. 
Moreover, the Act's legislative history manifests Congress's clear 
intention to rationalize and make appropriately proportionate the 
criminal penalties for drug offenses.28 As enacted in 1970, the Act 
provided a comprehensive sentencing system for drug offenses which 
was tied directly to the specific narcotic involved and the criminal his­
tory of the defendant.29 Against this backdrop of grading drug of-
25. Collado, 106 F3d at 1103. 
26. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 20, at 693 ("In recent years, almost all of the 
co=entary in legal periodicals has been critical of grand jury screening."). Historically, the 
indictment system was meant to act as both a sword and a shield: a sword that it provided 
the prosecution with a valuable investigative tool, and a shield to the extent that it protected 
defendants from wrongful prosecutions. See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do 
Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 262-63 (1995). Today, the 
role of the grand jury as a shield has been almost entirely eclipsed by its role as an 
investigative tool. See Susan W. Brenner, The Voice of the Community: A Case for Grand 
Jury Independence, 3 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 67, 67 (1995); see also Leipold, supra, at 263 
("The grand jury is frequently criticized for failing to act as a meaningful check on the 
prosecutor's charging decisions; according to the cliches it is a 'rubber stamp,' perfectly 
willing to 'indict a ham sandwich' if asked to do so by the government."). In recent years, 
grand juries have returned indictments in over 99.5% of the cases charged. See id. at 274. 
27. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884) {declining to incorporate the indict­
ment requirement against the states). 
28. See, e.g., BOGOMOLNY ET AL., supra note 3, at 5 ("The Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act of 1970 is considered by many to be a major advance in bringing 
some coherence and rationality into a highly diffuse area"). 
29. See Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (providing mandatory minimum sentences 
depending on the schedule designation of the narcotics involved, and providing for doubled 
mandatory minimum sentences for defendants with prior drug-related convictions). 
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fenses, Congress provided the most serious penalties, and the only 
mandatory minimum penalties, for drug traffickers. 30 Especially long 
sentences were provided for defendants convicted of selling drugs to 
minors,31 and a second conviction for drug trafficking doubled the 
mandatory minimum penalty pursuant to section 841. 
Nevertheless, as originally enacted the Act narrowly circumscribed 
the prior offenses that triggered section 84l's doubling provisions, 
limiting them to prior federal felony drug convictions.32 Thus, the Act 
in its original form did not distinguish between prosecutions from the 
various states. Congress substantially amended the Act in 1984. 
Among the many changes to the Act, the amendment permitted prior 
state and foreign felony drug convictions to double mandatory mini­
mum sentences. 33 It did not amend section 851, however, and the 
Act's overall restructuring in 1984 should not be read to create distinc­
tions between states' methods of prosecution where none originally 
existed. The 1984 amendments reinforced Congress's goal of provid­
ing a "more rational penalty structure"34 for drug offenses, a goal 
which would be undermined by forcing courts to distinguish between 
practically indistinguishable prior convictions. 
Barring an alternative interpretation of the statute,35 this argument 
against inconsistency in the treatment of prior state convictions is a 
strong reason for not interpreting section 85l(a)(2) as referring to the 
prior offense. While this argument is compelling for eliminating an 
anomalous result, it is ultimately unsatisfactory. A better interpreta-
30. See S. REP. No. 91-613 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C. A. N. 4566, 4576 (referring 
to§ 408, later codified as§ 841: "This section . . .  is the only provision of the bill providing 
minimum mandatory sentences, and is intended to serve as a strong deterrent to those who 
otherwise might wish to engage in the illicit traffic, while also providing a means for keeping 
those found guilty of violations out of circulation"). 
31. See 21 U.S.C. § 859 (1994). 
32 See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 
91-513, § 401, 84 Stal 1260, 1260-62; 1984 U.S.C.C.A. N. at 3438 (doubling mandatory sen­
tences "if the offender has previously been convicted of a Federal drug offense"); 1970 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4614; see also United States v. Beasley, 12 F.3d 280, 284 (1st Cir. 1993) 
(finding that sentence enhancements under § 841, as enacted in 1970, could not be triggered 
by prior state law drug convictions); United States v. Gates, 807 F.2d 1075, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 
1986) (interpreting the 1970 Act's doubling provisions to be triggered only by prior federal 
convictions). The only prior convictions that triggered a sentence enhancement were those 
"punishable under this subsection, or for a felony under another provision of this title or of 
title III or other law of the United States relating to narcotic drugs." Act, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, § 401, 84 Stat. 1260 (amended 1984). 
33. See Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 
98 Stat. 2068 (amending the description of prior convictions that trigger the § 841 doubling 
provisions to read, "an offense punishable under this paragraph, or for a felony under any 
other provision of this title or title III or other law of a State, the United States, or a foreign 
country relating to narcotic drugs"). This change is particularly important for the discussion 
in infra Section I.B. 
34. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3437. 
35. See infra Part II. 
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tion would both avoid the anomaly and 'provide a reason why 
Congress included the indictment requirement at all. 
B. Interpreting "The Offense" to Refer to the Present Offense Renders 
the Statute Mere Surplusage 
Several courts have found that interpreting section 85l(a)(2) as re­
ferring to the present conviction renders the statute mere surplusage.36 
Superficially, this provides a strong reason why the section 851(a)(2) 
indictment requirement should not refer to the present offense. This 
argument, however, offers no independent justification for holding 
that section 851(a)(2) refers to the prior offense. 
Courts and commentators have observed - incorrectly - that all 
federal prosecutions proceed by indictment or waiver of indictment. 37 
Accordingly, the requirement that the present conviction - which is 
necessarily a federal conviction - must have proceeded by indictment 
appears to render section 851(a)(2) surplusage. If these courts' and 
commentators' premise were correct, it would be a strong reason to 
reject applying the indictment requirement to the present offense. It 
is the "first principle of statutory construction" that statutes be inter­
preted not to render any section mere surplusage.38 As Judge Winter 
observed in his concurrence in Collado, "[T]he government's reading 
of Section 851 [that it refers to the present offense] creates a redun­
dancy that makes virtually no sense. "39 Judge Winter agreed with the 
majority's outcome in Collado but objected to its reliance on the prin­
ciple of lenity. He reasoned: 
If the language [in section 851(a)(2)] refers only to the offense charged in 
the particular case, the language is entirely superfluous because that 
Section applies to offenses that can be prosecuted only by indictment or 
waiver thereof. . . . Where an ambiguity admits of two interpretations, 
one of which creates an inexplicable redundancy and the other of which 
36, See United States v. Collado, 106 F.3d 1097, 1103 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding the mere 
surplusage argument appealing); United States v. Burrell, 963 F.2d 976, 992-93 (7th Cir. 
1992) (finding that the surplusage argument "is not without its appeal"); United States v. 
Harden, 37 F.3d 595, 601 (11th Cir. 1994) (agreeing with Burrell). 
37. See supra note 36; LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 20, at 686. 
38. See california v. Department of Justice, 114 F.3d 1222, 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see 
also Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 369 n.14 (1986). 
39. Collado, 106 F3d at 1105 (Winter, J., concurring). While the majority in Collado 
ultimately rested its holding on the principle of lenity, it found the mere surplusage argu­
ment appealing. See Collado, 106 F3d at 1103. The Santana court found that the Second 
Circuit's approach "merits a close look at the statutory scheme," United States v. Santana, 
No. 95-10284-PBS-008, 1997 WL 258599, at *2 (D. Mass. Mar. 11, 1997), but ultimately de­
clined to follow the Second Circuit. The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits also considered and 
agreed with the surplusage argument but found that it was not dispositive. See Burrell, 963 
F.2d at 993; Harden, 37 F.3d at 601. 
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makes sense, I see no need to revert to the rule of lenity to resolve the 
ambiguity.40 
Judge Winter's argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, 
not all federal prosecutions proceed by indictment.41 Second, even on 
Judge Winter's own terms, his argument proves too much. A close 
look at the Act's legislative history reveals that section 851(a)(2) was 
surplusage as enacted whether it refers to the present or the prior of­
fense. 
Between the Act's enactment in 1970 and its amendment in 1984, 
only prior federal felony convictions triggered a sentence enhance­
ment pursuant to section 841. Therefore, whether "the offense" in 
section 851(a)(2) was referring to the prior offense or the present of­
fense, it was referring to a federal felony prosecution. According to 
those courts and commentators who argue that all federal felony 
prosecutions proceed by indictment, section 851 's indictment require­
ment was superfluous whether it was referring to the present or the 
prior offense. The logical conclusion of Judge Winter's concurrence, 
in light of the Act's legislative history, is that the indictment require­
ment was meaningless as enacted, providing no insight into the offense 
to which it was referring. It also reveals the second statutory challenge 
hidden within section 851(a)(2): Which prosecutions did Congress 
mean to exclude with its indictment requirement? 
The two strongest arguments courts have proposed in support of 
their interpretations are ultimately inconclusive. The argument for 
consistency of sentences between indictment and non-indictment 
states has practical force but fails to provide any meaning for the in­
dictment requirement in section 851(a)(2). The surplusage argument 
fails in the face of legislative history. Neither argument provides an 
affirmative interpretation of the Act.42 
40. Collado, 106 F.3d at 1105 (Winter, J., concurring). 
41. This realization is the basis for the opinion in Ortiz and is considered infra Part II. 
42. Until Ortiz, courts interpreting § 851(a)(2) have argued only in the negative, relying 
on what Congress must not have meant. See Collado, 106 F.3d at 1101-03 (rejecting all ar· 
guments as unpersuasive and applying the rule of lenity in the absence of an obvious inten· 
tion of the legislature); Harden, 37 F.3d at 600-01 (rejecting the mere surplusage argument 
and finding that § 851(a)(2) must refer to the present conviction or it would necessitate an 
impermissible ex post facto increase in punishment); United States v. Trevino-Rodriguez, 
994 F.2d 533, 536 (8th Cir. 1993) (agreeing with Espinosa and the Seventh and Tenth 
Circuits); Burrell, 963 F.2d at 992 (agreeing with Espinosa and finding that§ 851(a)(2) must 
refer to the present offense or it would implicate ex post facto concerns); United States v. 
Adams, 914 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1990) (agreeing with Espinosa and finding that § 
85l(a)(2) must refer to the present offense or it would implicate ex post facto concerns); 
United States v. Espinosa, 827 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that § 851(a)(2) must refer 
to the present offense because of the anomalous situation that would result from a contrary 
interpretation); Santana, 1997 WL 258599, at *2 (finding that§ 851(a)(2) must refer to the 
present offense or it would subvert the congressional goal of dealing with drug offenses in a 
comprehensive fashion). The unpersuasive ex post facto argument is considered infra note 
69. 
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II. AFFIRMATIVE INTERPRETATIONS 
Part I of this Note demonstrated the difficulty courts have had in­
terpreting section 851(a)(2). Courts developed reasons why not to 
adopt particular interpretations but, until Ortiz, had not suggested 
what effect the indictment requirement was intended to have. In fact, 
the Act's legislative history combined with the Collado court's analysis 
suggest that section 851(a)(2) was surplusage as enacted and has no 
meaning at all.43 It is, however, a basic tenet of statutory construction 
to give effect to every word and every section of a statute.44 The inter­
pretive challenge, then, is clear: to develop an affirmative interpreta­
tion of section 851(a)(2) that does not render it superfluous, but also 
does not force courts to distinguish between prior convictions from in­
dictment and non-indictment states. In Ortiz, the Second Circuit 
made a significant step in the right direction but ultimately failed to 
provide a compelling interpretation. 
Section II.A first reviews the Second Circuit's opinion in Ortiz and 
demonstrates how it avoids the surplusage argument raised in Collado. 
This Section approves of the approach in Ortiz but disagrees with its 
conclusion. Instead, Section II.B argues that section 851(a)(2)'s in­
dictment requirement was meant to prohibit the use of juvenile con­
victions to trigger a sentence enhancement. This Section examines the 
Act's legislative history from 1970 and finds clear congressional con­
cern about the increase of drug use among juveniles. This Section fur­
ther demonstrates that interpreting the indictment requirement to 
prevent sentence enhancements for juvenile prosecutions coheres with 
several of the Act's other provisions that show leniency for juvenile 
defendants. Section II.C returns to the original statutory ambiguity 
and argues, in light of its new interpretation, that "the offense" refers 
to prior juvenile convictions. Part II concludes that section 851(a)(2) 
must refer to juvenile convictions because it is the only meaningful in­
terpretation that gives positive effect to the statutory section without 
requiring courts to distinguish between prior convictions from indict­
ment and non-indictment states. 
A The Virgin Islands and the Panama Canal Zone 
In United States v. Ortiz, the Second Circuit revisited its holding in 
Collado and reversed its prior decision. In Ortiz, the Second Circuit 
made the first judicial attempt to provide the kind of affirmative 
reading of the indictment requirement advocated by this Note. By 
identifying a class of federal prosecutions that did not proceed by in­
dictment - prosecutions in the Virgin Islands and Panama Canal 
43. See supra Section I.B. 
44. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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Zone - the Ortiz court avoided the surplusage argument advanced by 
Collado and held that "the offense" refers to the present offense. The 
Ortiz opinion, however, fails to suggest why Congress would choose to 
distinguish prosecutions in some United States territories from other 
federal prosecutions. 
Ortiz rehearses the Collado opinion and demonstrates why the 
Espinosa line of cases remains unsatisfying.45 Ortiz recognizes that 
"[t]he [Collado] panel could find no basis for deciding whether [sec­
tion 851(a)(2)] was meant to apply to the instant or prior prosecu­
tion."46 Instead of criticizing the earlier panel, Ortiz relies on "new in­
formation"47 to argue that section 851 was meant to refer to the 
present offense. 
[A]t the time§ 851(a)(2) was formulated in 1970, federal felony narcotics 
violations were prosecutable without indictment in the Virgin Islands, 
and the Panama Canal Zone. Moreover, in Guam, federal prosecutions 
proceeded without indictment until 1968.48 
Therefore, Ortiz held that a defendant's sentence may not be en­
hanced if his federal felony conviction originated in one of these three 
territories because it would not have proceeded by indictment. The 
federal indictment requirement is not mere surplusage. According to 
the implicit assumption motivating Ortiz, section 851(a)(2) was meant 
to prohibit doubling the sentences of defendants prosecuted in the 
Virgin Islands and the Panama Canal Zone because of a prior drug 
conviction. 
While logically sound, the interpretation offered by Ortiz finds no 
support in the Act's legislative history or in any intelligible congres­
sional concerns. There is no evidence from the Act's legislative his­
tory that Congress intended to deal differently with convictions pro­
ceeding in the Virgin Islands or the Panama Canal Zone than with 
convictions proceeding in any of the fifty states.49 The court in Ortiz 
offers no principled reason why Congress might have provided for 
such differential treatment. Absent a meaningful rationale, the Ortiz 
holding undercuts Congress's goal of rational sentencing in its treat­
ment of the various United States territories. 
45. See United States v. Ortiz, 143 F.3d 728, 731 (2d Cir. 1998). 
46. Ortiz, 143 F.3d at 731. 
47. Ortiz, 143 F.3d at 731. The "new information" included territorial statutes from the 
1960s brought to the court's attention for the first time in Ortiz. 
48. Ortiz, 143 F.3d at 731. 
49. An exhaustive search of the Act's legislative history reveals no references to any 
United States territories. This Note also ignores Judge Leval's reference to Guam because, 
by his own admission, federal prosecutions in Guam did proceed by indictment by the time 
the Act was enacted. 
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B. Preventing Juvenile Convictions from Triggering a Sentence 
Enhancement: A Convincing Interpretation of Section 851 (a)(2) 
839 
There is a meaningful class of federal felony prosecutions that does 
not proceed by indictment or waiver of indictment: juvenile prosecu­
tions, which proceed by criminal information.5 0 Legislative history and 
other statutory provisions demonstrating congressional concern about 
juvenile sentencing support this reading of the statute. 
The Code, in 18 U.S.C. § 5032, provides for jurisdiction in district 
court over juvenile respondents in specific situations, including for 
violations of section 841.5 1 In cases where a United States district 
court does have jurisdiction over a juvenile, "[t]he Attorney General 
shall proceed by information .... "5 2 The use of criminal information 
for juvenile prosecutions under section 841 means that section 
851(a)(2) does not need to refer only to territorial prosecutions to 
avoid superfluity. If the indictment requirement excludes juvenile 
prosecutions, it proscribes the use of a meaningful class of federal fel­
ony prosecutions as triggers for a sentence enhancement.5 3 
This interpretation also aligns with congressional concern for juve­
nile drug defendants. Prior to the Act's enactment in 1970, Congress 
devoted significant time to considering the effect of new sentencing 
50. See 18 U. S.C. § 5032 (1994). 
51. 18 U. S.C. § 5032 provides for surrender of juvenile defendants to state courts: 
[ u ]nless the Attorney General, after investigation, certifies to the appropriate district court 
of the United States that (1) the juvenile court or other appropriate court of a State does not 
have jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction over said juvenile with respect to such al­
leged act of juvenile delinquency . . .  or (3) the offense charged is a crime of violence that is a 
felony or an offense described in section 401 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 
841) . . . . 
18 U. S.C. § 5032. In other words, section 5032 provides explicitly for federal jurisdiction 
over a juvenile charged under 21 U. S.C. § 841. In 1970, when the Act was enacted, federal 
juvenile prosecutions were governed by the Juvenile Delinquency Act. See 52 Stat 764. 
Altliough this earlier juvenile statute was substantially different from tlie present Juvenile 
Delinquency Act, it still provided expressly for juvenile prosecutions to proceed by informa­
tion instead of indictment See id.; see also Barnes v. Pescor, 68 F. Supp. 127, 127 (W. D. Mo. 
1946) (interpreting tlie information requirement). · 
52. 18 U. S.C. § 5032. The relevant section states in its entirety: "The Attorney General 
shall proceed by information or as autliorized under section 3401(g) of this title, and no 
criminal prosecution shall be instituted for tlie alleged act of juvenile delinquency except as 
provided below." 18 U. S.C. § 5032 ( Supp. 1995-98). Section 3401(g) is concerned only witli 
magistrate trials of juveniles charged witli a petty offense. 
53. The actual number of federal juvenile prosecutions is extremely small. Since 1989, 
no more tlian 70 juveniles have been prosecuted in federal court for drug violations in any 
one year. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ-163066, 
SPECIAL REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
(1997). Despite its small size, however, tlie class remains meaningful; tliere are many rea­
sons why Congress would have provided leniency for juvenile defendants. See infra Section 
11.C. Furtliermore, tlie Act was enacted partly in response to tlie increase in juvenile drug 
defendants. See infra notes 54-63 and accompanying text. In 1970, Congress may not have 
known whetlier federal juvenile prosecutions would become far more frequent. 
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provisions on juveniles.54 Concerned with the consequences of unduly 
harsh criminal sanctions, Congress was hesitant to pass a statute that 
would "make felons of one of every five college students. "55 As Con­
gress found, more people would be convicted if they faced lighter sen­
tences because of prosecutors' increased willingness to bring charges 
and judges' increased willingness to impose the sentences.56 Further­
more, unduly severe penalties fostered in juveniles a distrust of the le­
gal system and a general skepticism towards authority.57 
54. In 1969, President Nixon wrote a letter to Congress urging congressional action on 
the growing threat of drugs in the United States. This letter, cited in many committees and 
on the floor of the House and Senate, began with statistics concerning juvenile arrests in­
volving the use of drugs. See, e.g., Controlled Dangerous Substances, Narcotics and Drug 
Control Laws: Hearing Before the House Comm on Ways and Means, 91st Cong. 195 (1970) 
[hereinafter Ways and Means Hearing] (letter from Richard Nixon, President of the United 
States) ("Between the years 1960 and 1967, juvenile arrests involving the use of drugs rose 
by almost 800 percent; half of those now being arrested for the illicit use of narcotics are un­
der 21 years of age."). Congressional concern with drug abuse amongst juveniles is evident 
throughout the Act's legislative history. See, e.g., Ways and Means Hearing, supra, at 245 
(statement of Michael R Sonnenreich, Deputy Chief Counsel, Bureau of Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs) ("[W]e are concerned about the fact that you are dealing in one of the 
largest state offense categories other than drunkenness, and that most of the people who 
come before the courts are young people with an average age of 20 years and have never 
come into a confrontation with the criminal justice system before."); 116 CONG. REC. 33,297 
(1970) (statement of Rep. Smith of California) ("[I)t is clear enough that the United States 
faces a serious drug problem, particularly with respect to our young people."); Drug Abuse 
Amendments, 1970: Hearings on H.R. 11701 & H.R. 13743 Before the Subcomm. on Pub. 
Health & Welfare of the House Comm on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong. 64 
(1970) [hereinafter Interstate and Foreign Commerce Hearing] (statement of Rep. Harold T. 
Johnson of California) ("[Abuse of drugs] is taking its greatest toll among the youth of our 
Nation."); Interstate and Foreign Commerce Hearing, supra, at 179 (statement of Dr. Stanley 
F. Yolles, Director, National Institute of Mental Health) ("It seems that today, if a chemical 
can be abused, it will be. . . . One further identifiable ominous trend is the indulgence in 
drugs of abuse by younger and younger age groups."). 
55. Interstate and Foreign Commerce Hearing, supra note 54, at 69-70 (finding that 20 
percent of college students polled admitted to using marijuana and suggesting that this was a 
"gross underestimation"). 
56. See Interstate and Foreign Commerce Hearing, supra note 54, at 81 ("The greatest 
enforcement problem with the existing penalty structure is that it is too severe in relation to 
the culpability of the user and the dangers of the drugs. Also, the severity of the penalties, 
given the violation, are out of step with the rest of the Federal Criminal sanctions in the U.S. 
Code. The result has been a reluctance on the part of prosecutors to prosecute and judges to 
sentence offenders under the existing penalty structure."); id. at 144 (statement of John E. 
Ingersoll, Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Department of Justice) ("I 
think that we are going to get more convictions because of the greater flexibility that is pro­
vided to the courts in sentencing . . . . The existing penalties are really out of proportion to 
penalties that are contained in other parts of the Federal law."). 
57. See Interstate and Foreign Commerce Hearing, supra note 54, at 144 (statement of 
Rep. Satterfield of Virginia) ("I am quite concerned for example, about letters that I get 
from school children who pose the question to me as to what I think of a law against mari­
juana that makes criminals out of so many people."); see also Ways and Means Hearing, 
supra note 54, at 449 (statement of Mrs. Edward F. Ryan, Chairman for Legislation, 
National Congress of Parents & Teachers (quoting P.T.A. testimony in respect to Drug 
Abuse Education Act)) ("The situation is made more dangerous in our view, because the 
feeling of injustice in respect to the disproportionate penalties in present law distracts the at­
tention of youth from the dangers of drugs. It is the nature of youth to overreact to pressure 
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With these concerns in mind, Congress included several provisions 
in the original Act that specifically treated first-time juvenile respon­
dents differently than other defendants. For example, 21 U.S.C. § 844 
provided that defendants convicted of simple possession shall be 
placed on probation for not more than one year. This reflects a policy 
described by Representative Rogers from Florida, who said, 
The committees which have considered this legislation do not seek ... to 
make felons of our young men and women who come into contact with 
drugs on a first occasion, but nor should we condone such action, and 
surely we must not encourage its repetition. The penalty structure and 
approach of this legislation carries out that intent. A first offense of pos­
session of controlled drugs is made a misdemeanor, except where the 
possession is for the purpose of distribution to others.58 
Juveniles convicted for the first time of simple possession had their 
records expunged of the conviction after one year,59 providing addi­
tional protection for the juvenile defendant that is not provided to an 
adult.60 
This particular concern for juveniles is also reflected in the provi­
sions of the Act dealing with dangerous special drug offenders. In 21 
U.S.C. § 859, the Act provides that a defendant may face substantially 
higher penalties for distributing narcotics to people under the age of 
twenty-one.61 These provisions, however, only apply to defendants 
who are over eighteen years old.62 Juveniles are exempted from the 
statute's higher penalties. The legislative approach was well summa­
rized by Representative Dwyer from New Jersey who said: "By arm­
ing the Justice Department with laws to concentrate on the vendors 
and purveyors of hard narcotics and at the same time providing the 
courts discretion in dealing with first offenders and minors, it strikes 
hardest at those who threaten our society most."63 
In summary, Congress demonstrated its concern for juvenile drug 
defendants by providing a clean record for juveniles convicted of sim-
they feel unjust; thus they are even more likely to use drugs in bravado, and the situation is 
unnecessarily worsened. "). 
58. See 116 CONG. REC. 33,304 (1970). 
59. See Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513 § 404, 84 Stat. 1264 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 
Stat. 2027 (1984)). 
60. See Ways and Means Hearing, supra note 54, at 349 (statement of Rep. Biaggi of 
New York) ("[This] provision would permit special judicial consideration of first offenders 
under 18 years of age. Too often youngsters are taken up into the drug scene by unscrupu­
lous adults out of their own financial gain or by the pressures from companions to be 'part of 
the crowd' or by a natural youthful curiosity. It would be unequitable to treat these offend­
ers with the same severity as a hardened criminal."). 
61. See 21 U. S.C. § 859 (1994). 
62 See 21 U. S.C. § 859. 
63. 116 CONG. REC. 33,306-07 (1970). 
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pie possession and exempting juveniles from the enhanced sentences 
of dangerous special drug offenders. These specific statutory provi­
sions and the various findings in the congressional record evidence 
Congress's clear concern for juvenile drug offenders. Interpreting sec­
tion 851(a)(2)'s indictment requirement as prohibiting juvenile drug 
convictions from triggering a sentence enhancement is entirely consis­
tent with these statutory sections, and with Congress's explicit legisla­
tive concerns. 64 
C. Prior or Present Juvenile Convictions? 
Even if "the offense" in section 851(a)(2) refers to a juvenile con­
viction, the question remains whether it refers to a prior or present ju­
venile conviction. That is to say, the question remains whether all 
prior juvenile convictions are proscribed from triggering a sentence 
enhancement, or whether the indictment requirement only prohibits a 
sentence enhancement for defendants who are still juveniles at the 
time of the present offense. 
In revisiting the original crux of this controversy, it is essential to 
remember that the strongest arguments proposed by each side of the 
one-time circuit split are no longer applicable. Whether section 
851(a)(2) refers to the present or to the prior offense, courts will not 
have to distinguish between prior convictions from indictment and 
non-indictment states or territories, and there is no danger of the stat-
64. One possible counterargument that could be raised turns on the distinction between 
drug use and drug trafficking. Congress was manifestly concerned with leniency for juvenile 
defendants convicted of drug use. See supra text accompanying notes 54-63. Congress drew 
a sharp distinction between provisions for drug users and drug traffickers. See Ways and 
Means Hearing, supra note 54, at 244 (quoting the exchange among Mr. Vanick, Attorney 
General Mitchell, and Mr. Sonnenreich) 
MR. V ANICIC Your bill treats the possession of a first offender as a misdemeanor. Does this 
apply to both the user and the seller who is a first offender? 
ATIORNEY GENERAL MITCHELL. It does with respect to the user. The seller, of course, can 
have possession and be brought in under some of the other penalties contained there, par· 
ticularly in the conspiracy aspect of it. 
MR. SoNNENREICH. The intent of that provision, sir, is to cover simple possession for one's 
own use. It does not cover the possession with intent to sell. 
Id.; see also Ways and Means Hearing, supra note 54, at 352 (statement of Rep. Biaggi of 
New York) ("If he is not a seller, of course, a simple individual who uses [drugs] and is 
caught and is under 18, should be dealt with separately."). Since § 841, and consequently § 
851, deals exclusively with drug trafficking, one could argue that Congress did not intend to 
show the same leniency in these sections as it did in the statutory sections dealing with juve­
nile drug users. There is evidence, however, that Congress viewed the juvenile drug traf­
ficker as a victim of the adult pusher. See Ways and Means Hearing, supra note 54 
(statement of Rep. Horton of New York) ("Addicts, too many of them teenagers and young 
men and women in their early twenties, desperately need money to support their habit, and 
they turn to crime to support it For the victim of addiction, we must extend compassion, 
understanding and treatment."). Congress drew a distinction between the drug user and 
trafficker by providing mandatory minimum sentences for the trafficker. Leniency for the 
juvenile drug trafficker still amounts to a prison sentence, just not a doubled prison sentence. 
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ute becoming mere surplusage. Therefore, arguments that might have 
seemed weak before, compared with the seemingly decisive arguments 
discussed above in Part I, are now relatively strong by comparison. 
1. Not-So-Plain Language 
Courts have reasoned to contradictory conclusions from the lan­
guage of the statute and the referent of "the offense" in other parts of 
the statute. Section 851 requires the United States Attorney to file an 
information with the court "stating in writing the previous convictions 
to be relied upon,"65 thus providing the defendant with an opportunity 
to object to the validity of any prior conviction.66 
Several courts, including the court in Espinosa, have used the plain 
language of section 851 to argue that "the offense" must refer to the 
present offense. The Espinosa court found that "the two other usages 
of the term 'offense' in § 851 refer to the current offense."67 The 
Espinosa court also found that section 851 consistently refers to the 
prior offense as "prior convictions" and "previous convictions," and 
concluded that "[h]ad Congress intended [the defendant's interpreta­
tion]; it seems that the phrase simply would have read 'prosecution by 
indictment in the prior conviction.' "68 
Relying on the same "plain" language of the statute, the court in 
Collado reached the opposite conclusion. The Collado court argued 
that, within section 851, Congress always refers to the present offense 
as "an offense under this part,"69 meaning an offense under the 
65. 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(l). 
66. See 21 U.S.C. § 851(b). 
67. United States v. Espinosa, 827 F.2d 604, 617 (9th Cir. 1987). 
68. Espinosa, 821 F.2d at 617. Espinosa also relied on an unpersuasive argument impli­
cating ex post facto and double jeopardy concerns. "[A]lthough one may not be punished 
twice for the same crime, punishment for a second crime may be enhanced by reason of a 
second conviction . . . . Hence, a common-sense reading of the phrase 'offense for which 
such increased punishment may be imposed' is the current, or latest, offense." Espinosa, 821 
F.2d at 617; see also United States v. Adams, 914 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1990) ("Obvi­
ously the punishment for a past, prior offense cannot be subsequently increased ex post facto. 
But the punishment for the current offense in the case at bar can appropriately be enhanced 
and made more severe because the current offense is not the appellant's first violation of the 
criminal law . . . .  "). The language of § 851 contradicts this interpretation directly. "[T]he 
offense for which such increased punishment may be imposed" could also mean, "the of­
fense by reason of which" or "the offense because of which" such increased punishment is 
being imposed. See Adams, 914 F.2d at 1407. Section 851 itself later provides, "[I]f the court 
determines, after hearing, that the person is subject to increased punishment by reason of 
prior convictions, the court shall proceed to impose sentence upon him as provided by this 
part" 21 U.S.C. § 85l(d)(l) (emphasis added). Since sentences can be enhanced by reason 
of a prior conviction without implicating double jeopardy concerns, see, e.g., Witte v. United 
States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995), the double jeopardy and ex post facto arguments are an uncon­
vincing basis from which to conclude that "the offense" must refer to the present offense. 
69. See United States v. Collado, 106 F.3d 1097, 1102 (2d Cir. 1997) (referring to 21 
U.S.C. § 851(a)(l), (e) (1994)) 
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Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.70 In 
section 851(a)(2), Congress refers not to "an offense under this part," 
but to "the offense for which such increased punishment may be im­
posed."71 As Justice Scalia has noted, "[w]hen the legislature uses cer­
tain language in one part of the statute and different language in an­
other, the court assumes different meanings were intended."72 
Accordingly, "the offense for which such increased punishment may 
be imposed," is a different offense from "an offense under this part." 
If Congress had meant to refer to the present offense, it would have 
said simply, "an offense under this part."73 
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of "the offense" as the "present 
offense" is flawed for yet another reason. Although unmentioned by 
the Second Circuit, the Espinosa court was incorrect when it observed 
that "[s]ection 851 consistently uses the terms 'prior conviction[s]' and 
'previous convictions' to denote the prior conviction."74 Section 851 
refers to the prior conviction several times without calling it the "prior 
conviction" or the "previous conviction."75 In contrast, section 851 
only refers to the present conviction twice, and each time explicitly as 
"an offense under this part. "76 
Inevitably, courts examining section 851(a)(2) begin their discus­
sions with the statutory language, trying to tease out support for their 
conclusions from the Act's unhelpful language. No court, however, 
has rested its holding on the statute's plain language, since that lan­
guage appears to support contradictory holdings. Weighed carefully, 
the Act's language favors interpreting the indictment requirement as 
referring to the prior offense; but if this argument were compelling on 
its face, there would have been no statutory ambiguity giving rise to 
the present controversy. Ultimately, the statute's plain language re­
mains inconclusive but favors, if only slightly, interpreting "the offense 
70. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 85l{a) ("No person who stands convicted of an offense under 
this part [21 uses §§ 841 et seq.] shall be sentenced to increased punishment by reason of 
one or more prior convictions, unless before trial . . .  the United States attorney files an in­
formation with the court" (emphasis added)). 
71. 21 U.S.C. § 85l{a)(2). 
72. O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 96 {1996) {Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 2A 
NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.07 (5th ed. 1992 & 
Supp. 1996)). 
73. See Collado, 106 F .3d at 1102 ("[I]t is an equally valid observation that had Congress 
intended to refer to the instant offense, it seems it would have referred to 'an offense under 
this part,' or simply to 'the offense.' "). 
74. United States v. Espinosa, 827 F2d 604, 617 {9th Cir. 1987) (second alteration in 
original). 
15. For example, § 851 refers to the prior conviction as: "any conviction alleged," 21 
U.S.C. § 851(c){l), "a conviction alleged in the information,'' 21 U.S.C. § 851(c)(2), and "the 
convictions to be relied upon," 21 U.S.C. § 851{c){l). 
76. 21 U.S.C. § 851{a), (e). 
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for which such increased punishment may be imposed" as the prior of­
fense. 
2. Structural Consistency 
The Act's structure also provides some support for interpreting 
"the offense" as referring to the prior offense. Section 851 limits the 
prior convictions that can trigger a sentence enhancement. Therefore, 
section 851(a)(2) is most consistent with the overall statutory scheme 
if "the offense" refers to the prior offense. 
Broadly read, section 851 limits the application of section 841 sen­
tence enhancements based on prior convictions. Congress intended 
these procedural safeguards in section 851 to provide several ways in 
which a prior conviction would be an invalid trigger for a sentence en­
hancement. As originally enacted, prior state and foreign convictions 
were invalid triggers.77 A conviction obtained in violation of the 
Constitution of the United States was similarly invalid.78 A defendant 
could also object to the existence of any alleged prior convictions on 
factual grounds.79 Because each of these limitations refers to the prior 
offense, the further requirement that "the offense" must have been 
prosecuted by indictment or waiver of indictment seems more consis­
tent with the Act's overall structure if it too refers to the prior offense. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts have debated whether "the offense" in section 851(a)(2) re­
fers to the present or the prior offense. Their arguments have been 
unable to offer a satisfying interpretation of the statute. They have 
relied only on what Congress must not have meant, instead of provid­
ing an explanation of what Congress did mean to accomplish with the 
section 851(a)(2) indictment requirement. In Ortiz, the Second 
Circuit finally proposed an affirmative interpretation of the indictment 
requirement, discovering one class of federal felony prosecutions that 
proceeds by criminal information. Ortiz, however, provides no reason 
why Congress might have been especially concerned with non­
indictment prosecutions in the Virgin Islands or the Panama Canal 
77. See supra text accompanying note 34. 
78. See 21 U.S.C. § 851(c)(2) (providing the procedure for objecting to a prior convic­
tion on the grounds that it was "obtained in violation of the Constitution of the United 
States"). 
79. See 21 U.S.C. § 85l(c)(l) (providing the defendant with an opportunity to deny any 
allegation in the information filed with the court, and providing further that "the United 
States attorney shall have the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on any issue of 
fact"). With these requirements, § 851 "prescribes the procedure for establishing prior con­
victions so as to authorize imposition of an increased penalty upon a subsequent conviction." 
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at4618. 
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Zone. Looking at the Act's history, section 851(a)(2) is better inter­
preted to prohibit juvenile convictions from triggering a sentence en­
hancement. 
This interpretation of section 851(a)(2) aligns with the Second 
Circuit's approach in Ortiz. It avoids the Collado court's surplusage 
argument by recognizing that not all federal felony prosecutions 
proceed by indictment or waiver of indictment and resolves the Ninth 
Circuit's unwillingness to distinguish between prior convictions from 
various state courts. Interpreting section 851(a)(2) as referring to 
juvenile convictions makes such distinctions unnecessary. All prior 
adult convictions, whether federal or from any state or foreign court, 
will trigger a sentence enhancement. 
Furthermore, this interpretation of section 851(a)(2) aligns with 
several other of the Act's specific statutory provisions providing more 
lenient treatment for juvenile defendants. The Act's indictment re­
quirement should be interpreted to prevent prior juvenile felony drug 
convictions from doubling a defendant's mandatory minimum sen­
tence pursuant to section 841. 
